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Does Assurance on CSR Reporting Enhance Environmental Reputation?  
An Examination in the U.S. Context 
 
Introduction 
 
 The issuance of standalone corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports1 has grown 
dramatically over the past two decades and KPMG International indicates that 71 percent of the 
4,100 companies it surveyed worldwide in 2013 engaged in CSR reporting (KPMG International, 
2013).  However, as noted by Cho et al. (2014, p. 131), this practice, “as with all types of 
voluntary corporate disclosure . . . is subject to concerns regarding the completeness and 
credibility of the information that is being provided” (also see Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007; 
Bouten et al., 2011; Bouten et al., 2012).  Numerous commentators argue that third-party 
assurance on CSR reports can increase credibility (see, e.g., Beets and Souther, 1999; Holder-
Webb et al., 2009; Simnett et al., 2009; Cohen and Simnett, 2015; Casey and Grenier, 2015), and 
KPMG International (2013, p. 11) reports such assurance continues to grow with over half of the 
Global 250 corporations now including outside assurance on their standalone CSR documents.   
Perhaps owing to the relative newness of the practice, empirical analyses related to CSR 
report assurance are limited, and only a few studies to date investigate its impacts. Among these, 
Cho et al. (2014) document no significant relation between assurance and market valuation, 
whereas Casey and Grenier (2015) find that firms with CSR report assurance exhibit lower cost 
of equity capital, lower analyst forecast errors and less forecast dispersion.  From a different 
perspective, Michelon, Patten and Romi (2015) examine whether CSR report assurance adds 
credibility to the information disclosed and report a positive relation between assurance and 
restatement of previously reported CSR information. 
                                                 
1 The reports are issued under a variety of differing names including, for example, citizenship, social responsibility, 
and sustainability reports.  In this paper, we refer to all of these issuances as ‘CSR reports’. 
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In this study, we argue that, rather than being issued mainly to reduce information 
asymmetries between management and investors as argued by Dhaliwal et al. (2011), Casey and 
Grenier (2015), and others, standalone CSR reporting may also be used in an attempt to increase 
the environmental image of corporations (Michelon, Pilonato and Ricceri, 2015).2 This view is 
supported by KPMG International’s (2011, p. 18) claim that “the business imperative behind CR 
[Corporate Responsibility] reporting” is reputation. More recently, KPMG International (2013, p. 
44) argues reporting enhances reputation internally (with a significant positive impact on 
employee pride and motivation, attraction and retention of talented employees) and externally 
(by strengthening relationships with external stakeholders and building credibility with 
customers). Furthermore, the organization asserts that “positive effects are dependent on the 
quality and credibility of reported information” (p.45) and sustain this claim quoting John Viera 
of Ford: “To get a reputational benefit you need your actions to match your words and to report 
in a consistent and transparent way against an accepted framework”. Accordingly, if firms 
acquire outside assurance of their reports to enhance the credibility of the message being 
portrayed as argued in much recent research (e.g., Park and Brorson, 2005; Simnett et al., 2009; 
Kolk and Perego, 2010; Michelon, Patten and Romi, 2015), we would expect the practice to 
impact assessments of its environmental reputation as opposed to being directly related to 
differences in firm value.   
 In order to better identify the potential benefits of assurance in the CSR domain, we 
investigate whether standalone CSR report assurance in the U.S. appears to lead to better outside 
assessments of firms’ environmental reputation.  We use environmental reputation scores 
reported as part of Newsweek magazine’s rankings of the ‘greenest companies in America’ from 
                                                 
2 It should be noted that increases in environmental image could lead to economic effects such as those reported by 
Casey and Grenier (2015). 
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2009 and 2010,3 and identify firms in the listing with a standalone CSR report issued in the prior 
year.  Controlling for other factors potentially influencing the ratings, we find, based on a sample 
of 351 firm-year observations, that assurance is highly associated with higher assessments of 
companies’ environmental reputation.  We also explore whether impacts on environmental 
reputation differ depending on assurance provider type – accounting firms versus other 
providers.  Our results indicate that having assurance from either type of provider is significantly 
related to increased environmental reputation, suggesting that it is the presence of assurance, as 
opposed to assurer type that impacts assessments of corporate environmental reputation.   
 We begin our study with a review of prior investigations related to assurance of 
standalone CSR reporting. 
Background 
 
Empirical research into assurance on standalone CSR reporting is relatively limited and, 
to date, most studies focus either on descriptive analyses of the practice or factors driving 
assurance choice.  With respect to the former, for example, Mock et al. (2007) examine an 
international sample of 130 entities with assurance on their CSR reports between 2002 and 2004 
and report that, geographically, the practice was most common for firms from the European 
Union (E.U.). With respect to industry sector, electric and energy firms and oil and gas 
companies had the highest representation.  Focusing on reports issued in 2006 or 2007, Mock et 
al. (2013) identify a growing trend of assurance by financial services companies, but note that 
firms in the E.U. continued to exhibit the highest likelihood of having their CSR reports assured.  
With respect to examination of the determinants of CSR report assurance, Park and 
Brorson (2005), based on interviews with executives from Swedish firms, suggest the primary 
                                                 
3 Although Newsweek continued issuing annual rankings beyond 2010, it discontinued the use of an environmental 
reputation survey as part of the assessments beginning with the 2011 rankings. 
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factor driving the decision to seek assurance was the need for enhanced credibility.  In a much 
broader empirical study, Simnett et al. (2009) use a large international sample of companies to 
examine the impact of both country-level and firm specific factors on the choice to have CSR 
reports assured.4  Based on reports issued over the 2002 through 2004 period, Simnett et al. 
(2009) find that stakeholder orientation at the country level, firm size, and industry affiliation all 
were significantly related to CSR report assurance choice, with the first of those factors as the 
most dominant.  However, when U.S. firms were deleted from the sample, stakeholder 
orientation was no longer significant, and as such, Simnett et al. (2009) conclude, in line with 
Park and Brorson (2005), that the need for enhanced credibility appears to drive demand for 
assurance.  In a similar study, Kolk and Perego (2010) also investigate whether country-level and 
firm specific factors influence the demand for CSR report assurance. With the exception that 
firm size was not significant for their sample of Fortune Global 250 companies, results were 
largely consistent with those reported by Simnett et al. (2009).  
From a different perspective, Jones and Solomon (2010) interviewed CSR representatives 
from 20 U.K. firms regarding their perceptions of the need for, and benefits of, CSR report 
assurance.  Interestingly, a majority of the interviewees were reluctant to support external 
assurance on the reports, partly because of the practice’s “relative current unimportance” (Jones 
and Solomon, 2010, p. 29).5  However, Jones and Solomon (2010, p. 30) also report that their 
findings indicate “managers are using [assurance] as a way of reinforcing [CSR reporting] as a 
method of giving a favorable impression of the company to outside stakeholders.”  Somewhat 
                                                 
4 Simnett et al. (2009) also examine the impact of these factors on report issuance and the choice of assurer 
(accountant versus non-accountant). 
5 Other reasons reported by Jones and Solomon (2010) for the lack of support of external assurance on CSR reports 
included the complexity of CSR reporting, cost, and concerns with the independence of assurance providers. 
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similarly, Edgley et al. (2010), based on interviews with assurance providers in the U.K., identify 
that CSR report assurance can add value by helping to manage reputation risk. 
Several recent studies focus more exclusively on CSR report assurance in the U.S. as this 
is a market where the practice is less common compared to the international context (Simnett et 
al., 2009; KPMG, 2011). Cho et al. (2014) analyze a sample of companies included in the 2010 
Fortune 500 and find that, in addition to industry affiliation, more extensive disclosure within the 
CSR report increases the likelihood of having external assurance. Casey and Grenier (2015) use 
a panel sample of 2,649 CSR reports over the period 1993-2010 and find that global operations, 
higher cost of capital, and increased advertising intensity increase the likelihood of having 
assurance, while leverage is negatively related to it.  Interestingly, they also find that firms with 
CSR concerns are also more likely to obtain external CSR assurance, and they interpret this 
finding as an indication that some firms might be using assurance for impression management 
purposes.  Finally, Peters and Romi (2015) present evidence that expertise in sustainability at the 
board level increases the likelihood of CSR report assurance over the period 2002-2010, 
inclusive.  
 In general, each of the studies examining determinants of CSR report assurance choice 
presents evidence that the need for enhanced credibility plays at least some role in the choice to 
seek assurance.  Two recent experimental investigations show that, at least in some cases, 
assurance on a CSR report leads to a perception of increased credibility.  In the first of these, 
Hodge et al. (2009) use a surrogate sample of business students in Australia and report a positive 
relation between assurance and perceptions of credibility, although the relation does not hold 
when the assurance level is limited or the assurer is not a top-tier accounting firm.  Pflugrath et 
al. (2011), also using an experimental design, similarly report a positive relation between CSR 
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report assurance and perceived credibility.  Based on a sample of financial analysts from 
Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom, Pflugrath et al. (2011) also find that the 
impacts on credibility are higher when reporting companies are from industries where assurance 
is more common, and that, for analysts from the U.S., assurance by a professional accountant 
impacts credibility more than when assurance comes from a sustainability consultant.   
 From a different perspective, Cho et al. (2014), in their analysis of U.S. CSR reports, 
examine whether the presence of assurance on CSR reports is associated with increased market 
value.  Citing claims from Clarkson et al. (2008) and Dhaliwal et al. (2011) that the reporting is 
intended to signal superior social and environmental positions to market participants, Cho et al. 
argue that the assurance, if it strengthens the credibility of the information provision, should lead 
to higher market valuation.  However, using an Ohlson (1995) valuation model controlling for 
disclosure extensiveness, Cho et al. find no differences in firm value across companies with and 
without assurance on their standalone CSR reports. Starting on the assumption that the low rate 
of adoption of CSR report assurance in the U.S. could be due to assurance being an ineffective 
form of credibility enhancement, Casey and Grenier (2015) also investigate capital market 
effects of CSR report assurance and find support for a negative association between first-time 
adoption of assurance and cost of capital and analyst forecast errors and dispersion. 
A final set of studies within the CSR report assurance domain go beyond examination of 
assurance itself, and focus on potential differences associated with the choice of assurance 
provider.  Cohen and Simnett (2015) note the accounting profession does not have a monopoly in 
the CSR report assurance market, and studies investigating assurance provider choice typically 
distinguish across accounting firms and consultants (Casey and Grenier, 2015; O’Dwyer and 
Owen, 2005; Michelon, Patten and Romi, 2015; Peters and Romi, 2015; Pflugrath et al., 2011; 
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Simnett et al., 2009).  Evidence for differences appears mixed.  For example, Simnett et al. 
(2009) find little support for their hypothesis that firms with a higher need to enhance credibility 
are more likely to choose assurance from the accounting profession, although Pflugrath et al. 
(2011), in an experimental setting, find that U.S. participants seem to value assurance by 
accounting firms more than consultants.  Casey and Grenier (2015) argue that accounting firms 
are likely to be associated with a higher level of assurance quality and document, at the 
univariate level, that accounting providers are associated with a greater reduction in cost of 
capital and marginally with analyst forecast dispersion. They also find that firms with greater 
CSR strengths are more likely to purchase assurance from accounting firms, while firms with 
greater CSR concerns are more likely to use consultants.  Michelon, Patten and Romi (2015) find 
that both accounting firms and consultants alike are associated with greater instances of 
restatements of CSR information.  Finally, Peters and Romi (2015), using an Ohlson (1995) 
valuation model, find that assurance by accounting firms is weakly associated with market 
valuation, but only in the latter years of their investigation.    
Hypotheses Development 
 Even if more limited than in other parts of the world, the existence of CSR report 
assurance in the U.S. at least to some extent suggests that managers must see benefit in the 
practice.  Although the evidence reported by Casey and Grenier (2015) suggests that investors 
appear to value the first time adoption of assurance, we argue here that the lack of market 
valuation impacts reported by Cho et al. (2014) may be due to a misplaced focus on the intent of 
the reporting. More important than being a vehicle for reducing information asymmetries 
between managers and investors as argued by Ballou et al. (2006), Dhaliwal et al. (2011), and 
others, standalone CSR reports may instead be used to enhance the social and environmental 
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image of the firms (see, e.g., Cho et al., 2012). Indeed, Brown et al. (2010, p. 86) identify that 
KPMG International in its 2008 survey of sustainability reporting “noted that more than half of 
its survey respondents . . . cited reputation or brand enhancement as an underlying reason for the 
issuance of a sustainability report.”  Cho et al. (2012, p. 16) further note that the Global 
Reporting Initiative also asserts that CSR reporting “can lead to enhancement of corporate 
reputation.” 
 Gotsi and Wilson (2001, p. 29) define corporate reputation as “a stakeholder’s overall 
evaluation over time” and note this is based on “direct experiences with the company, any other 
form of communication and symbolism that provides information about the firm’s actions and/or 
a comparison with the actions of other leading rivals”. Deephouse and Carter (2005) similarly 
claim that stakeholders determine reputational standing through comparison with other 
organizations.  As argued by Unerman (2008, p. 362), “a corporation’s reputation among its 
economically powerful stakeholders is a valuable asset” and “within this context, CSR reporting 
is a potentially powerful medium which corporations can use to try to influence” perceptions 
about the firm.  Having a stronger environmental reputation can benefit a company by reducing 
its exposure to social and political pressures (Cho and Patten, 2007), allowing it to potentially 
charge premium prices for its products (Gardberg and Fombrun. 2006), and increasing its appeal 
to socially responsible investors (Patten and Zhao, 2014).  However, Brown et al. (2010) also 
note that where the reporting is perceived as disingenuous, it is less likely to have positive 
reputational effects, and they show, for example, that first-time standalone report issuance had 
less positive benefits for companies from firms in industries facing social exposures and for 
firms with less extensive information provision in their reports. 
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 If, as argued by Beets and Souther (1999), Simnett et al. (2009) and others, third-party 
assurance increases users’ perception of standalone CSR report credibility regarding the 
environmental information being provided, we expect the disclosure would be less likely to be 
seen as disingenuous, and, accordingly, could lead to better outside assessments of firms’ 
environmental reputation.  We explore this relation in our empirical analysis and state our first 
hypothesis, in null form as:  
 H1:  Ceteris paribus, assurance on standalone CSR reports has no relation with 
  perceptions of companies’ environmental reputation. 
 
The second aspect of our analysis focuses more specifically on the type of assurance 
provider and potential differences in impact on environmental image.  Provider type has been 
argued as possibly affecting the quality of the assurance service.  Accounting firms are thought 
to be more conservative and cautious (O’Dwyer and Owen, 2005) as they are subject to both 
independence and professional conduct requirements, adhere to professional standards, and 
generally are associated with a high level of reputational capital (Simnett et al., 2009; Huggins et 
al., 2011; Casey and Grenier, 2015).  Further, accounting firms follow more detailed and 
consistent procedures, and thus, in the absence of generally accepted and consolidated assurance 
standards, they also tend to limit their assurance (O’Dwyer and Owen, 2005).  As accountants 
are likely to transfer the well-established financial statement verification practice to the 
sustainability arena, they focus on assuring only those items fitting the conventional financial 
accounting testing procedures (such as numerical indicators) (O’Dwyer, 2011; O’Dwyer et al., 
2011).   However, O’Dwyer and Owen (2005, p. 226) argue that “accountants’ reluctance to 
mention their credentials suggests that they may rely on their brand name, as opposed to any 
substantive work, to convey an impression of assurance,” and they emphasize how assurance 
provided by accounting firms might be in fact a symbolic exercise. Similarly, Perego and Kolk 
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(2012), although finding that accounting firms appear to deliver better quality with respect to the 
reporting format and procedures followed in the assurance process, note that accountants show a 
lack of transparency in the assurance engagement especially with respect to reporting on 
completeness and responsiveness. 
In contrast, consulting firms possess specific sustainability (and in particular 
environmental) expertise and technical skills, although they are not subject to the same standards 
of professional conduct, reporting standards, and independence as accountants (Simnett et al. 
2009).  O’Dwyer and Owen (2005, pp. 225-226) note that “consultant assurors tend to focus 
much more on the issues of completeness, fairness and overall balance within their opinion 
statements” as they often “were involved as the reporting process emerged, as opposed to merely 
arriving at the end to verify data collection procedures and accuracy.”  Accordingly, O’Dwyer 
and Owen (2005) argue that consultant assurers adopt a more strategic approach to the assurance 
exercise, and thus external stakeholders may perceive more value from the process in that the 
level of assurance is considered to be higher than as is the case with accounting firm assurance.  
It is unclear, based on the discussion above, whether the impacts of assurance on 
perceptions of companies’ environmental reputation will differ across provider type, and we 
explore this issue in the second stage of our analysis.  We formally state our second hypothesis, 
again in null form, as: 
H2: Ceteris paribus, differences in assurance provider type will not affect assurance 
 impact on perceptions of companies’ environmental reputation. 
 
Methods 
 
Sample  
 
As we discuss in more detail below, we rely on the environmental reputation scores 
reported by Newsweek magazine in its 2009 and 2010 assessments of the ‘greenest companies in 
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America’.   Accordingly, to be included in our analysis, companies had to have been listed on the 
Newsweek ranking in year t, have issued a standalone CSR report in year t-1, have KLD CSR 
ratings for year t-1 available from MSCI, Inc., have information on assurance of the CSR reports 
in Thomson Reuters ASSET4,6 have ESG reporting quality scores available in Bloomberg, and 
have data for financial control variables available on Thomson Reuters Datastream. Panel A of 
Table 1 identifies our sample distribution by year.  Overall, we include 351 observations with 
165 from 2009 and 186 from 2010.  The percentage of sample reports with assurance remains 
stable over the two years at just over 18 percent for each period.  
---------- Table 1 about here --------- 
Empirical Models 
Our examination focuses on the association between CSR report assurance and 
companies’ environmental reputation using scores as reported by Newsweek magazine in its 2009 
and 2010 rankings of ‘the greenest companies in America’.  The reputation measures represent 
one of three different metrics compiled by Newsweek in calculating its rankings.7 The scores are 
based on surveys of environmental reputation conducted for Newsweek by CorporateRegister 
seeking opinions from academics, professionals and other environmental experts (Cho et al., 
2012). Guidry and Patten (2010) argue that the Newsweek survey’s main strengths are that 
respondents are from a much broader group than those used for other assessments of corporate 
reputation (such as Fortune’s ‘Most Admired’ annual survey) and the survey’s questions focus 
on environmental reputation as opposed to broader aspects of firm performance. Because 
                                                 
6 Asset4 collects the information on whether there is a statement from an external auditor on the standalone CSR 
report. 
7 The other components are an environmental performance assessment score computed for Newsweek by the non-
governmental organization, Trucost, and an environmental policies score provided to Newsweek by KLD Analytics. 
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Newsweek no longer included environmental reputation scores as part of its assessments 
beginning in 2011, we are limited to an analysis of relations for 2009 and 2010. 
We examine the companies’ environmental reputation (EnvRep) in year t and assess 
relations to assurance of the standalone CSR report from the prior year (year t-1). We use a 
one/zero indicator variable to designate firm-year observations where the CSR report had 
external assurance.  Because a higher environmental reputation score indicates better 
environmental reputation, we expect our assurance variable to be positively related to the 
environmental reputation score.  In our analysis focusing on assurer type, we replace the Assurer 
variable with separate one/zero indicator variables capturing whether the assurer was an 
accounting firm (Assurance – Audit) or another type of organization (Assurance – Other).  We 
expect each assurer type to be positively associated with our environmental reputation measure. 
We control for several factors that might be expected to influence environmental 
reputation.  These include, first, firm size, which we measure as the natural log of sales (LnSales).  
Several studies (e.g., Brown and Perry, 1994; Brown et al., 2010; Craig and Brennan, 2012; 
Guidry and Patten, 2010) note that, presumably owing to visibility, survey assessments of 
corporate reputation are positively associated with firm size.     
Second, we control for membership in environmentally sensitive industries.   Because 
companies from environmentally sensitive industries are deemed to have more negative impacts 
on the environment and thus are, in comparison to companies from other industries, less 
environmentally sustainable, we expect membership in environmentally sensitive industries (ESI) 
to be negatively related to perceptions of environmental standing.8  We follow prior research 
(e.g., Cho et al., 2010; Clarkson et al., 2008; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Patten, 2002) and 
                                                 
8 Consistent with this belief, Guidry and Patten (2010) report that the reputation scores included in the 2009 
Newsweek ratings were negatively associated with membership in environmentally sensitive industries. 
14 
 
classify companies whose primary operations are in the chemicals, metals, mining, paper, 
petroleum, or utilities industries as being environmentally sensitive.  
Our third control variable centers on assessments of the sample companies’ actual 
environmental performance.  We follow prior studies (e.g. Cho et al., 2012; Dhaliwal et al., 2011) 
and use KLD performance ratings from the company MSCI, Inc.  MSCI assesses performance 
across a variety of different measures and scores companies with respect to both strengths and 
concerns.  However, based on Chatterji et al.’s (2009) evidence that the environmental strength 
scores are not valid measures of performance, we use only the KLD environmental concern score 
(KLDEnvCon) as our proxy for environmental performance in this study. A priori, we would 
expect companies with worse environmental performance (higher concern scores) to be ranked 
lower in terms of perceptions of environmental standing.  Consequently, we predict a negative 
association between KLDEnvCon and environmental reputation. 
We also control for firms’ financial performance in the form of return on assets (ROA) as 
our fourth control variable.  Guidry and Patten (2010) document that the environmental 
reputation score in 2009 was positively associated with financial performance, a finding 
consistent with investigations of other measures of CSR reputation (see, e.g., Brown and Perry, 
1994; Brown et al., 2010).  In addition, Waddock and Graves (1997) argue that better financial 
performance potentially results in the availability of slack resources providing an opportunity for 
companies to invest in CSR activities, which in turn could be expected to influence 
environmental reputation.   
 In order to address the concern that the perceptions of environmental reputation could be 
due to the disclosure within the reports rather than the presence of an assurance statement, we 
follow Eccles et al. (2011) and Eccles et al. (2014) and control for disclosure extensiveness using 
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Bloomberg ESG disclosure scores (DiscScr).  As noted by Eccles et al. (2014), Bloomberg 
assesses the completeness of reporting across a range of environmental, social, and governance 
items, and reports extensiveness along a scale ranging from 0 to 100 percent.  Cho et al. (2012) 
found greater environmental disclosure is positively associated with environmental reputation, 
and we thus expect a positive association between DiscScr and our dependent variable.    
Finally, we include a year indicator variable (using 2009 as the base year) to allow for 
year fixed effects. 
We use ordinary least squares multiple regression analysis to estimate our environmental 
reputation model.  The model, with expected relations in parentheses below each independent 
variable, is stated as: 
 
EnvRep (it) = a1 + B1 Assuranceit-1 + B2 Ln(Sales)it-1 + B3 ESIit-1 + B4KLDEnvConit-1 
      (+)         (+)         (-)              (-) 
 
+ B5ROAit-1 + B6DiscScr + B7Year2010  
                   (+)     (+)              (none) 
 
For the second stage of the analysis, Assurance is replaced with Assurance-Audit and 
Assurance-Other classification variables. 
Results 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Panel B of Table 1 presents definitions for the variables used in our analysis, while Table 
2 summarizes descriptive statistics.  As indicated in Table 2, sample company environmental 
reputation scores range from 8.86 to 100 with a mean of 48.62.  Overall, 65 of the 351 company-
year CSR reports include assurance, and in the vast majority of cases the assurance comes from a 
non-accounting firm source.  On average, our sample companies are large (mean LnSales = 
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16.65) and profitable (average ROA = 0.08).  Just over a quarter of our observations come from 
companies designated as belonging to an environmentally sensitive industry.  KLD 
environmental concerns range from zero to five with a mean of 1.17.  Finally, the mean 
Bloomberg ESG disclosure score for our sample firms was 38.81 based on a range from 11.16 to 
75.10.  
---------- Table 2 about here --------- 
Correlations 
Table 3 shows the correlations between the variables with Pearson product-moment 
metrics presented above the diagonal and Spearman’s Rho measures below. At the univariate 
level, we find that Assurance is positively and significantly associated with environmental 
reputation.   
---------- Table 3 about here ---------- 
Regression Results 
 We present the results of our multiple regression analysis for the relation between 
assurance presence and environmental reputation in Panel A of Table 4.  As indicated in the 
table, the model is highly significant (based on the model F-statistic) with an adjusted R2 of 
0.323.  All control variables are signed as expected, and, with the exception of ESI and ROA, 
they are statistically significant at p = .05, one-tailed, or better.  Most importantly, the assurance 
variable, as hypothesized, is significantly (at p < .001, one-tailed) associated with environmental 
reputation scores.  The positive sign indicates that companies with report assurance have a higher 
reputation than firms without assurance, suggesting that assurance positively influences 
perceptions of firms’ environmental standing. 
---------- Table 4 about here ---------- 
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 In additional sensitivity tests, we examine whether the influence of assurance differs 
across firms from environmentally sensitive industries or across differences in environmental 
performance based on the KLD environmental concern scores.  We use interaction terms to 
capture these potential effects. Neither of the additional control interactions is statistically 
significant at conventional levels, and the relation between Assurance and environmental 
reputation continues to hold. 
 In order to test H2, we replace the Assurance variable with separate metrics capturing 
assurer type.  Results of the regression analysis on environmental reputation are presented in 
Panel B of Table 4.  As noted in Panel B, both Assurance-Audit (at p = .004, one-tailed) and 
Assurance-Other (at p = .003, one-tailed) are positively and significantly associated with 
environmental reputation.  These results suggest that outside assurance positively influences 
perceptions of environmental reputation regardless of assurer type. 
Additional Analysis 
 As noted above, Cho et al. (2014) report a significant association between the 
extensiveness of disclosure within CSR reports and the choice to obtain outside assurance.  
Further, a review of Table 3 indicates that, in addition to disclosure extensiveness (DiscScr) both 
firm size (LnSales) and environmental performance (KLDEnvCon) are significantly correlated 
(at p < .01, two-tailed) with the presence of assurance.  Accordingly, to address potential 
endogeneity concerns, we replace our Assurance metric with Assurance*, where the latter 
measure is the residual from the OLS regression of Assurance on DiscScr, LnSales, and 
KLDEnvCon.9  As reported in Table 5, Assurance* remains positively and significantly (at p = 
.001, one-tailed) associated with environmental reputation scores. 
                                                 
9 We also calculate a residual based on inclusion of all of the remaining independent variables.  Results, not 
presented, are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 5. 
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Conclusion 
 Although, concurrent with the growth of standalone CSR reporting over the past twenty 
years, the incidence of outside assurance on the reports continues to become more prevalent in 
the U.S. and worldwide, explorations of the potential value from the service remain quite limited.  
In one of the few studies investigating potential impacts of the practice, Cho et al. (2014) fail to 
find any significant relation between the assurance and market valuation.  We argue in this 
examination that, rather than being used as a signaling device to corporate investors, standalone 
CSR reports instead are more likely used to enhance the environmental image of the issuing 
companies (see also Cho et al. 2015).  Accordingly, we attempt in this investigation to identify 
whether outside assurance on the CSR reports is related to higher assessments of companies’ 
environmental standing.  Focusing on environmental reputation and using a broad sample of 
report-issuing firms from the U.S., we find that assurance on the reports is significantly related to 
environmental reputation as captured by Newsweek magazine’s environmental reputation scores.  
We also find that the positive relation between assurance and environmental reputation hold, 
regardless of assurer type.   Overall, the results suggest that there may indeed be positive 
outcomes associated with the choice to seek assurance on standalone CSR reports, and this may 
help explain why some companies, at least in the U.S. setting, are willing to incur the expense 
related to the practice. 
 We note that some caveats are in order when interpreting our evidence.  First, our 
reputation measure relies on aggregated scores and as such, it does not reflect the potential 
richness, diversity, and ambiguity of the conceptual attributes of reputation (for an overview, see 
Fombrun, 1996).  Brammer and Pavelin (2006, p. 437), for example, argue that, because 
stakeholders likely have diverse preferences regarding firm actions, “reputational assessments 
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depend upon the congruence between the apparent behaviours of the firm and the preferences of 
those publics.”  A more qualitative investigation could thus shed light not only on how 
preferences regarding corporate environmental behavior might vary across (and potentially 
within) relevant stakeholder groups, but also how assurance on CSR reporting might impact 
individual assessments of the perceived credibility of firm actions, in turn potentially affecting 
the degree of perceived congruence with preferences.  Such an extension of our research could 
help bridge the gap between our more narrow assessment of environmental reputation and 
broader understandings of the concept.  
 A second limitation centers on the period of our analysis.  As we note above, because 
Newsweek chose to curtail the use of the reputation surveys after its first two greenest company 
assessments, our investigation is limited to 2009 and 2010.  As also noted above, the incidence 
of CSR report assurance in the U.S., consistent with the practice in other areas of the world (see 
KPMG International, 2013), appears to be growing, and whether the relations we report continue 
to hold as assurance becomes more common is worthy of future investigation should an 
alternative measure for environmental reputation become available.   
 Finally, we examine only U.S. companies, and as such, we cannot generalize our findings 
to firms in other countries.  This is potentially relevant given the U.S.’s classification as being 
more shareholder-oriented as opposed to stakeholder-oriented.  Whether assurance on CSR 
reports in more stakeholder-oriented domains similarly appears to induce impacts regarding 
environmental reputation could potentially make for an interesting extension of our study.   
  
20 
 
References 
Ballou, B., Heitger, D. L., and Landes, C. E. (2006). “The future of corporate sustainability 
reporting.” Journal of Accoun tancy, Vol. 200, No. 6, pp. 65-74. 
 
Beets, S. D. and Souther, C. C.  (1999). “Corporate environmental reports: The need for 
standards and an environmental assurance service.”  Accounting Horizons, Vol. 13, No. 
2, pp. 129-145. 
 
Bouten, L., Everaert, P., and Roberts, R. W.  (2012). “How a two-step approach discloses 
different determinants of voluntary social and environmental reporting.”  Journal of 
Business, Finance, and Accounting, Vol. 39, Nos. 5-6, pp. 567-605. 
 
Bouten, L., Everaert, P., Van Liedekerke, L., De Moor, L. and Christiaens, J.  (2011).  
“Corporate social responsibility reporting: A comprehensive picture?”  Accounting 
Forum, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 187-204.  
 
Brammer, S. J. and Pavelin, S.  (2006).  “Corporate reputation and social performance: The 
importance of fit.”  Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 435-455. 
 
Brown, D. L., Guidry, R. P., and Patten, D. M. (2010).  “Sustainability reporting and perceptions 
of corporate reputation: An analysis using Fortune most admired scores.”  Advances in 
Environmental Accounting and Management, Vol. 4, pp. 83-104. 
 
Brown, B. and Perry, S.  (1994). “Removing the financial performance halo from Fortune’s 
‘Most Admired’ companies.”  Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 37, No. 5, pp. 
1347-1359. 
 
Casey, R.J. and Grenier, J.H. (2015). “Understanding and contributing to the enigma of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) assurance in the United States.” Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice and Theory, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 97-130 
 
Chatterji, A. K., Levine, D. I., and Toffel, M. W.  (2009). “How well do social ratings actually 
measure corporate social responsibility?” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 
Vol. 18, No. 11, pp. 125–169. 
 
Cho, C. H., Guidry, R. P., Hageman, A. M., and Patten, D. M. (2012). “Do actions speak louder 
than words? An empirical investigation of corporate environmental reputation.” 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 14-25. 
 
Cho, C. H., Michelon, G., Patten, D. M. and Roberts, R. W.  (2014). “CSR report assurance in 
the USA: an empirical investigation of determinants and effects.”  Sustainability 
Accounting, Management and Policy Journal, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 130-148. 
Cho, C. H., Michelon, G., Patten, D.M. and Roberts, R.W. (2015). “CSR disclosure: the more 
things change…?” Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 28 No. 1, pp.14-
35. 
21 
 
 
Cho, C. H. and Patten, D. M.  (2007). “The role of environmental disclosures as tools of 
legitimacy: A research note.”  Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 32, Nos. 7–8, 
pp. 639–647. 
 
Cho, C.H., Roberts, R. W., and Patten, D. M. (2010). “The language of U.S. corporate 
environmental disclosure.”  Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 
431-443. 
 
Clarkson, P. M., Li, Y., Richardson, G. D., and Vasvari, F. P. (2008).  “Revisiting the relation 
between environmental performance and environmental disclosure: An empirical 
analysis.”  Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 33, Nos. 4/5, pp. 303-327. 
 
Cohen, J.R. and Simnett, R. (2015). “CSR and assurance services: a research agenda.” Auditing: 
A Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 59-74. 
 
Craig, R. J. and Brennan, N. M.  (2012).  “An exploration of the relationship between language 
choice in CEO letters to shareholders and corporate reputation.”  Accounting Forum, Vol. 
36, No. 3, pp. 166-177. 
 
Deephouse, D.L., and Carter, S.M.. (2005). “An examination of differences between 
organizational legitimacy and organizational reputation.” Journal of Management 
Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 329-360. 
 
Dhaliwal, D. S., Li, O. Z., Tsang, A., and Yang, Y. G.  (2011). “Voluntary nonfinancial 
disclosure and the cost of equity capital: The initiation of corporate social responsibility 
reporting.”  The Accounting Review, Vol. 86, No. 1, pp. 59-100. 
 
Eccles, R. G., Ioannou, I., and Serafeim, G.  (2014).  “The impact of corporate sustainability on 
organizational processes and performance.”  Management Science, Vol. 60, No. 11, pp. 
2835-2857. 
 
Eccles, R. G., Serafeim, G., and Krzus, M. P.  (2011).  “Market interest in non financial 
information.”  Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 113-127. 
 
Edgley, C. R., Jones, M. J., and Solomon, J. F.  (2010).  “Stakeholder inclusivity in social and 
environmental report assurance.”  Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Vol. 
23, No. 4, pp. 532-557. 
   
Fombrun, C. (1996). Reputation: Realizing Value from the Corporate Image. Harvard Business 
School Press, Boston. 
 
Gardberg, N. A. and Fombrun, C. J.  (2006). “Corporate citizenship: Creating intangible assets 
across institutional environments.”  Academy of Management Review, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 
329-346.  
 
22 
 
Gotsi, M. and Wilson, A. W.  (2001).  “Corporate reputation: Seeking a definition.”  Corporate 
 Communications: An International Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 24-30. 
 
Guidry, R. P. and Patten, D. M.  (2010). “Newsweek’s measure of corporate environmental 
 reputation and the “financial halo effect.”  Social and Environmental Accountability 
 Journal, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 4-12. 
 
Hackston, D. and Milne, M. J.  (1996). “Some determinants of social and environmental 
disclosures in New Zealand companies.”  Accounting, Auditing and Accountability 
Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 77-108. 
 
Hodge, K., Subramaniam, N., and Stewart, J.  (2009). “Assurance of sustainability reports: 
Impact on report users' confidence and perceptions of information credibility.”  
Australian Accounting Review, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 178-194. 
 
Holder-Webb, L., Cohen, J., Nath, L. and Wood, D.  (2009). “The supply of corporate social 
responsibility disclosures among U.S. firms.”  Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 84, No. 4, 
pp. 487-527. 
 
Jones, M. J. and Solomon, J. F.  (2010).  “Social and environmental report assurance: Some 
interview evidence.”  Accounting Forum, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 20-31. 
 
Kolk, A. and Perego, P.  (2010). “Determinants of the adoption of sustainability assurance 
statements: An international investigation.”  Business Strategy and the Environment, Vol. 
19, No. 3, pp. 182-198. 
 
KPMG International.  (2011). KPMG International Survey of Corporate Responsibility 
Reporting 2011. The Netherlands: KPMG International Cooperative. 
 
KPMG International.  (2013). The KPMG Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2013.  
The Netherlands: KPMG International Cooperative. 
 
Merkl-Davies, D. M. and Brennan, N. M.  (2007). “Discretionary disclosure strategies in 
corporate narratives: Incremental information or impression management?”  Journal of 
Accounting Literature, Vol. 26, pp. 116-194. 
Michelon, G., Patten, D. M., and Romi, A.M. (2015). “Sustainability report restatements as a 
legitimacy tool: evidence from the sustainability assurance practice”. 38th European 
Accounting Association (EAA) Annual Congress, Glasgow, UK  
Michelon, G., Pilonato, S. and Ricceri, F. (2015). “CSR reporting practices and the quality of 
disclosure: an empirical analysis”. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 33, pp. 59-
78. 
Mock, T.J., Strohm, C., and Swartz, K.  (2007). “An examination of worldwide assured 
sustainability reporting.” Australian Accounting Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 67-77. 
 
23 
 
Mock, T. J., Rao, S. S., and Srivastava, R. P.  (2013). “The development of worldwide 
sustainability reporting assurance.”  Australian Accounting Review, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 
280–294. 
 
O’Dwyer, B. (2011). “The Case of Sustainability Assurance: Constructing a New Assurance 
Service.” Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp.1230-1266. 
 
O’Dwyer, B., and Owen, D. L. (2005). “Assurance statement practice in environmental, social 
and sustainability reporting: A critical evaluation.” The British Accounting Review, Vol. 
37, No.2, pp. 205–229. 
 
O’Dwyer, B., Owen, D.L., and Unerman, J. (2011). “Seeking legitimacy for new assurance 
forms: The case of assurance on sustainability reporting.” Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, Vol 36, No. 1, pp. 31-52. 
 
Ohlson, J. A.  (1995). “Earnings, book values, and dividends in equity valuation.”  
Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 11, pp. 661-687. 
 
Park, J. and Brorson, T.  (2005). “Experiences of and views on third-party assurance of corporate 
environmental and sustainability reports.” Journal of Cleaner Production, Vol. 13, Nos. 
10-11, pp. 1995-1106. 
 
Patten, D. M.  (2002). “The relation between environmental performance and environmental 
disclosure: A research note.”  Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 27, No. 8, pp. 
763-773. 
 
Patten, D. M. and Zhao, N.  (2014). “Standalone CSR reporting by U.S. retail companies.”  
Accounting Forum, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 132-144. 
 
Perego, P., and Kolk, A. (2012). “Multinationals’ accountability on sustainability: The evolution 
of third-party assurance of sustainability reports.” Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 110, 
pp. 173-190. 
 
Peters, G. F. and Romi, A. M. (2015). “The association between sustainability governance 
characteristics and the assurance of corporate sustainability reports.” Auditing: A Journal 
of Practice and Theory, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 163-198. 
 
Pflugrath, G., Roebuck, P., and Simnett, R.  (2011). “Impact of assurance and assurer’s 
professional affiliation of financial analysts’ assessment of credibility of corporate social 
responsibility information.” Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol. 30, No. 3, 
pp. 239-254. 
Simnett, R., Vanstraelen, A., and Chua, W. F.  (2009). “Assurance on sustainability reports: An 
international comparison.” The Accounting Review, Vol. 84, No. 3, pp. 937-967. 
 
24 
 
Unerman, J.  (2008).  “Strategtic reputation risk management and corporate social responsibility 
reporting.”  Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 362-
364. 
 
Waddock, S. A. and Graves, S. B.  (1997). “The corporate social performance-financial 
performance link.”  Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 303–319. 
  
25 
 
Table 1 
Panel A – Sample selection and distribution 
 
      Sample  Reports with 
Year  Companies   Assurance 
 
 2009       165      31 (18.8%) 
 2010       186      34 (18.3%) 
  
 
 Total       351      65 (18.5%) 
 
 
Panel B – Variable definitions 
Variable Definition Source of data 
Assuranceit A 1/0 indicator variable where 1 identifies 
that company i’s CSR report included 
external assurance in year t 
Thomson Reuters Asset4 
EnvRepit Company i’s environmental reputation 
score based on CorporateRegister.com’s 
reputation survey and reported in the 
Newsweek magazine for year t 
Newsweek Environmental 
Reputation 
Ln(Sales)it The natural log of company i’s revenues in 
year t 
Thomson Reuters Datastream 
ROAit Company i’s year t earnings before interest 
and taxes on year t total assets 
Thomson Reuters Datastream 
ESIi A 1/0 indicator variable where 1 identifies 
that company i’s primary operations are in 
an environmentally sensitive industry 
(chemical, paper, metals, petroleum, 
mining and extractive, and utility 
industries) 
Thomson Reuters Datastream 
KLDEnvConit The total number of environmental 
concerns noted for company i in the KLD 
ratings for year t 
MSCI ESG data 
DiscScrit Bloomberg’s ESG disclosure extensiveness 
score for company i in year t.    
Bloomberg 
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Table 2 – Descriptive statisticsa (n = 351) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variables Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
EnvRep 8.86 100 48.62 16.32 
Ln(Sales) 14.30 19.87 16.65 1.06 
ROA -0.54 0.33 0.08 0.10 
KLDEnvCon 0 5 1.17 1.44 
DiscScr 11.16 75.10 38.81 13.16 
     
     
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Sample frequencies: 
 
  Assurance      65 
 (18.5%) 
 
  ESI       96 
 (27.4%) 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a Table 1 provides variable definitions. 
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Table 3 – Correlationsa 
 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients are reported above the diagonal and Spearman’s Rho correlation coefficients are reported 
below the diagonal. 
 
 
 Assurance EnvRep Ln(Sales) ROA ESI KLDEnvCon DiscScr 
Assurance 1 0.277** 0.247** -0.012 0.069 0.254** 0.368** 
EnvRep 0.264** 1 0.234** 0.046 -0.106* -0.012 0.308** 
Ln(Sales) 0.227** 0.181** 1 0.037 -0.152** 0.205** 0.064 
ROA -0.023 -0.011 0.021 1 -0.010 -0.049 0.060 
ESI 0.069 -0.077 -0.177** -0.045 1 0.549** 0.151** 
KLDEnvCon 0.194** 0.030 0.122* -0.068 0.553** 1 0.170** 
DiscScr 0.359** 0.311** 0.048 0.064 0.135* 0.148** 1 
 
*    Denotes significance at p < .05, two-tailed. 
**  Denotes significance at p < .01, two-tailed. 
 
a Table 1 provides all variable definitions. 
 
b Due to data availability, sample size is 351.
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Table 4 – Regression results for tests of the relation between Newsweek environmental 
reputation scores and assurance on standalone CSR reports. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A 
 
Model F-statistic = 24.909   Significance of F-statistic = < .001   Adj. R2 = .323 
 
   Predicted      Parameter 
Variablea   Relation       Estimate  t-statistic  Significanceb 
 
Constant    none        -28.299    -2.242        .026  
Assurance      (+)            7.042     3.389     < .001  
LnSales      (+)            3.536     4.733     < .001  
ESI       (-)           -2.194    -1.074        .142 
KLDEnvCon      (-)          -1.189    -1.835        .034 
ROA       (+)            6.458     0.892        .187 
DiscScr      (+)            0.290     4.877     < .001 
Year 2010    none          13.092     9.036     < .001 
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel B 
 
Model F-statistic = 22.140   Significance of F-statistic = < .001   Adj. R2 = .326 
 
   Predicted      Parameter 
Variablea   Relation       Estimate  t-statistic  Significanceb 
 
Constant    none        -27.706     -2.198     .029  
Assurance-Audit     (+)          14.074     2.700        .004  
Assurance-Other     (+)            6.121     2.825        .003 
LnSales      (+)            3.489     4.674     < .001  
ESI        (-)           -2.404    -1.175        .121 
KLDEnvCon       (-)           -1.129    -1.742        .041 
ROA       (+)            7.299     1.007        .158 
DiscScr      (+)            0.295     4.958     < .001 
Year 2010    none          12.962     8.944     < .001 
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a  Table 1 provides all variable definitions.  
b  Significance levels are one-tailed for variables with predicted relations. 
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Table 5 – Regression results for tests of the relation between Newsweek Environmental 
Reputation and assurance on standalone CSR reports – 2nd stage of 2 stage model to 
address endogeneity. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Model F-statistic = 24.573   Significance of F-statistic = < .001   Adj. R2 = .320 
 
   Predicted      Parameter 
Variablea   Relation       Estimate  t-statistic  Significanceb 
 
Constant    none        -38.317    -3.102        .002  
Assurance*      (+)            6.734     3.143        .001  
LnSales      (+)            4.036     5.479     < .001  
ESI       (-)           -2.194    -1.071        .142 
KLDEnvCon      (-)           -0.889    -1.387        .083 
ROA       (+)            6.223     0.858        .196 
DiscScr      (+)            0.359     6.414     < .001 
Year 2010    none          13.107     9.025     < .001 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a  Table 1 provides all variable definitions.  
b  Significance levels are one-tailed for variables with predicted relations 
 
 
 
